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Abstract: A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is how belief and 
credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship 
between belief and credence. On the belief-first view, what is it to have a credence just is to have a 
particular kind of belief, that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, 
I argue against the belief-first view: specifically, I argue that it cannot account for agents who have 
credences in propositions they barely comprehend. I conclude that, however credences differ from 
beliefs, they do not differ in virtue of adding additional content to the believed proposition.  
 






I believe many things. I believe that 1+1=2 and that my car is parked in front of my house. I also 
withhold belief on propositions, for example, that there is an even number of stars. And I disbelieve 
that it is 75 degrees in Antarctica right now and that 1+1=3. Many epistemologists focus on belief, 
withholding, and disbelief—call these belief-attitudes. But I’m more confident that 1+1=2 than that 
my car is parked outside (I haven’t seen my car since yesterday), even though I believe both things. 
For this reason, some epistemologists appeal to a second attitude, called credence. Credences are often 
given a value on the [0,1] interval, where 1 represents maximal confidence some proposition is true 
and 0 represents maximal confidence it is false. I have a credence of almost 1 (~0.99999…) that 
1+1=2, but a credence of 0.99 that my car is parked outside, and a 0.5 credence that a fair coin will 
land heads. 
 Assuming we have both beliefs and credences, a natural question arises: how do they relate to 
each other?1 Do either belief or credence reduce to the other? There are three main answers to this 
                                                        
1 For an overview of the relationship between belief and credence, see Jackson (2020).  
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question. On the credence-first view, belief reduces to credence.2 On the dualist view, belief and 
credence are equally fundamental.3  
 The focus of this paper is a third view, the belief-first view, that reduces credence to belief.4 
This view was originally characterized as one on which credences are beliefs about probabilities, so my 
0.9 credence it will rain tomorrow is a belief with the content the probability it will rain tomorrow is 0.9.5 
More recently, belief-firsters have claimed that credences are beliefs whose content is about not just 
probabilities, but epistemic modals more generally.6 For instance, a high credence that it will rain 
tomorrow is the belief it will probably rain tomorrow, where ‘probably’ is an epistemic modal. Credences 
can involve other epistemic modals, like ‘definitely’ and ‘might.’ Here is a version of that view: 
Belief-First: For S to have a credence of n in p just is for S to believe (Mp), where M is an 
epistemic modal and M and n correspond to each other.7  
 
Of course, this is only one possible belief-first view, but I focus on it because it has several advantages. 
First, it answers David Christensen’s (2004: 18) challenge to belief-first: if credences are probability-
beliefs, what is the interpretation of probability involved in the content of these beliefs? It answers: 
epistemic probability, which picks out a relation between one’s credences and one’s evidence.8  Epistemic 
probability is more plausible than the answers Christensen considers, that is, the subjective and the 
frequentist interpretations of probability (2004: 19–20). Further, on this belief-first view, credences 
can be precise—when one forms an explicit belief about the probability of some proposition, for 
                                                        
2 Foley (1993), Christensen (2004), Wedgwood (2008), Pettigrew (2015). 
3 Buchak (2014), Ross and Schroeder (2014), Staffel (2017), Jackson (2019), Weisberg (2020). 
4 Authors who discuss the belief-first view sympathetically include Harman (1986), Plantinga (1993: ch. 1), Lance (1995: 
sec. 4), Schiffer (2003: 200), Holton (2008, 2014), Weisberg (2013: sec. 3.1), Easwaran (2016), Horgan (2017), Dogramaci 
(2018: 10), Moon (2018, 2019), Moon and Jackson (2020), Kauss (forthcoming). Weisberg (2013) suggests that Hawthorne 
and Stanley (2008) ought to endorse the belief-first view. Authors who provide objections to belief-first include Kaplan 
(1996), Christensen (2004: 18-20), Frankish (2009: 76-78), Eriksson and Hájek (2007: 206–7), Staffel (2013), Moss (2018: 
7–8), Lee (2018: 278–9). 
5 See Christensen (2004: 18–20). 
6 See Moon (2018, 2019), Sturgeon (2020), Moon and Jackson (2020). 
7 Moon and Jackson (2020).   
8 Easwaran (2015), Sturgeon (2020), Moon and Jackson (2020). 
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example, believing the probability the coin lands heads is 0.5. But they can also be imprecise—when one’s 
credence involves an epistemic modal that doesn’t make a precise probability judgment, for example, 
it will probably rain tomorrow. 
 In this paper, I present a new objection to the belief-first view. My argument involves edge-
propositions. P is an edge proposition for S iff p is on the edge of S’s comprehension, such that S can 
grasp p, but, for any proposition more complex than p, S cannot grasp it. The objection I present here 
is a problem for any belief-first view that reduces a credence in p to a belief that (Xp). It doesn’t matter 
what X is—it could be probability, likelihood, epistemic modals, beliefs about dispositions, or some 
other modal or numerical component.9 Call any belief-first view that reduces a credence in p to belief 
in some content that is more complex than p a content-enhancing belief-first view. While I will proceed 
utilizing the epistemic-modal view above, my objection applies to any content-enhancing view, which 
is almost every belief-first view in the literature.10 
 This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I explain and defend my argument, showing 
how it counts against the belief-first view. In section 3, I consider and reply to objections. I conclude 
in section 4. I end this section by clarifying the notion of grasping with which this paper is concerned.   
 To explain what I mean by ‘grasping’ or ‘graspability’, we should examine the way the term is 
used in other philosophical literature. ‘Grasping’ comes up frequently in the epistemology of 
understanding literature. Consider an example from David Bourget (2017: 285–6): 
“Jane had been smoking for over fifteen years. Thanks to the government’s aggressive 
information campaign, she was fully informed about the dangers of smoking, but this never 
compelled her to quit. One day, a colleague of hers who was also a smoker was diagnosed with 
lung cancer. Learning about her colleague’s condition helped Jane grasp the dangers of 
smoking and made her quit for good.”  
 
                                                        
9 Sarah Moss (2018) has a view of credences she calls a “simple attitude, complex content” view, so my argument may be 
a problem for her view as well. However, Moss denies that beliefs and credences are propositional attitudes, so it is less 
clear how the arguments in this paper apply; this partially hangs on what is required of an agent mentally and phenomenally 
to have a belief whose content is a probability space, rather than a proposition. 
10 Possible exceptions include Easwaran (2016) and Kauss (forthcoming). 
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In this case, Jane initially does not grasp the dangers of smoking in the sense that Jane doesn’t fully 
appreciate (and act upon) her beliefs that smoking is dangerous. When her colleague is diagnosed with 
cancer, she ‘grasps’ the dangers of smoking in a new way, but arguably, this does not involve forming 
any new beliefs. Several have argued that, instead, what has changed is that Jane now understands the 
danger of smoking. This sense of grasping is often used to distinguish believing p or knowing p from 
understanding p.  
 The sense of grasping that concerns us is different. In this paper, I’m interested in a much 
thinner sense of grasping: namely, the minimal ability to comprehend a proposition, such that one can 
form a belief-attitude (or other attitude) with the proposition as its content. Of course, what is 
graspable is agent-relative. For example, Bengson (2015) discusses a mathematician, Ramanujan, who 
can easily grasp mathematical propositions that ordinary people cannot because the propositions are 
too complex. Similarly, adults can often grasp and form attitudes toward propositions not graspable 
for children. Our sense of graspability often comes up in the literature on epistemic justification, 
specifically in discussions of internalism’s strong awareness condition and infinitism.11 I will use the 
terms grasp/grasping/graspability to refer to this weaker sense of grasping, associated with the 
minimal comprehensibility of a proposition. 
 
 
2. The Argument 
 
Sally’s two friends, Erica and Billy, are fighting. Sally is telling her mom about this fight, and she says 
the following: “He said that she said that she knows that he believes that she is mad at him.” Her 
mother, concentrating and listening carefully, barely grasps this proposition; let’s suppose it is just at 
                                                        
11 Infinitism about justification is the view that a belief is justified by a belief in an infinite proposition or by an infinite 
number of beliefs. In response, some argue that since we cannot grasp, and thus cannot form beliefs about, an infinite 
proposition (or an infinite number of propositions), infinitism cannot be true. See Audi (1993), Klien (1999), Bergmann 
(2005: 432, 2006: ch. 1), Fales (2014). 
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the edge of her comprehension. Sally’s mom knows that Sally tends to side with Billy on things, so 
when she grasps this proposition she is somewhat skeptical, and is thus only moderately confident 
that it is true. In other words, Sally’s mom forms a moderately high credence that “he said that she 
said that she knows that he believes that she is mad at him.”  
 Consider a second example. Suppose John is a strong internalist who holds that view that for 
S to have a justified belief that p, S must have a justified belief that S’s belief that p is justified. Suppose 
John believes p. He then wonders if his belief that p is justified. He forms a new belief “my belief that 
p is justified.” He then wonders if this new belief is justified, and then forms the belief that “my belief 
that (my belief that p is justified) is justified.” He iterates this process several times until he encounters 
the very complex proposition: “my belief that (my belief that (my belief that (my belief that p is 
justified) is justified) is justified) is justified.” John forms a high credence in this complex proposition. 
Let’s suppose, like Sally’s mother, that this is an edge proposition for John.  
 These scenarios seem possible, but if they are possible, this creates a problem for any content-
enhancing belief-first view. Here’s how: John and Sally’s mother cannot form a belief in the 
proposition that embeds the sentence in an epistemic modal. The proposition is just on the edge of 
their comprehension, so the more complicated modal or probabilistic proposition is too complex for 
them to grasp. Thus, they cannot form the modal belief that corresponds to their credence; the modal 
proposition is ungraspable. 
More generally, recall that p is an edge proposition for S iff p is on the edge of S’s 
comprehension, such that S can grasp p, but, for any proposition more complex than p, S cannot grasp 
it. Plausibly, S can have a credence in an edge proposition, since S can grasp it. However, if p is an 
edge proposition, S cannot grasp Mp, and thus cannot form the more complex belief Mp. Here is a 
formalization of this argument: 
1. There is an edge-proposition, p, that is, (i) p is graspable for S and (ii) for any proposition 
more complex than p, S cannot grasp it. [premise]  
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2. S can have a credence in p. [premise, supported by 1] 
3. Mp is more complex than p. [premise] 
4. If S cannot grasp Mp, S cannot believe Mp. [premise] 
5. Therefore, S cannot believe Mp [1, 3, 4] and S can have a credence in p [2]. 
 
The conclusion, (5), entails the denial of the belief-first view. The first conjunct in (5) follows 
deductively from part (ii) of premise 1, and premises 3, and 4, and the second conjunct in (5) is premise 
2, which is supported by (i) of premise 1.  
Premise 1 is plausible and finds support in the literature. For example, Robert Audi (1993: 
209) says, “surely, for a finite mind, there will be some point or other at which the relevant proposition 
cannot be grasped.” Michael Bergmann (2005: 432) agrees: “before reaching a proposition they are 
unable to grasp, [agents considering perpetually more complex propositions] will reach one which they 
can barely grasp.” The existence of edge-propositions, for possible agents in possible scenarios, is hard 
to deny. 
In defense of premise 2, consider the following argument:  
2.1. For some edge proposition p, S can form a belief-attitude in p. 
2.2. If S can form a belief-attitude in p, S can form a credal-attitude in p.  
 
Premise 2.1 states that there are some edge-propositions that agents can form belief-attitudes towards. 
Note what it is not claiming: it does not entail that agents can form belief-attitudes toward all edge 
propositions, or that graspability is always sufficient for forming a belief-attitude. There could be (and 
likely are) conditions other than grasping needed for S to form an attitude to a proposition.  
 But why think that S can form a belief-attitude toward at least some edge proposition? In 
virtue of grasping p, S comprehends p. Yes, p is on the edge of S’s comprehension, but S nonetheless 
fully understands p’s meaning. And it’s hard to see why, in at least some case where S understands and 
grasps a proposition, S couldn’t either believe, withhold, or disbelieve it. This may have the surprising 
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result that we cannot believe everything entailed by our beliefs. Nonetheless, it’s hard to rule out the 
possibility that there is at least one edge proposition in which some agent can form a belief-attitude.12 
In defense of premise 2.2, it is difficult to see why S could have a belief-attitude toward p, but 
cannot have a credence in p. S can form a credence in p in virtue of S’s grasping p. Grasping p is often 
sufficient to form a credence in p, and surely it is at least possible to have a credence in a proposition 
that one has a belief-attitude towards. In other words, this premise states there is a belief-credence 
parity—if S believes p, then possibly, S has a credence in p.  
It follows from 2.1 and 2.2 that there is at least one edge-proposition S can both believe and 
form a credence in. Further, note that premise 2 seems plausible even apart from this argument. In 
our examples, John and Sally’s mother grasp the complex proposition and form a moderately high 
credence in it. Most readers will find stories like these intuitive and unobjectionable.13  
 Premise 3 is also plausible—a proposition embedded in an epistemic modal is more complex 
than the proposition not embedded. Recall that I’ve focused on content-enhancing belief-first views; 
on these views, complexity is added to the content of what is believed. The added complexity of Mp 
is what captures the fine-grained features that set credences apart from beliefs. This premise is hard 
to deny, and belief-firsters should accept it by their own lights.  
Premise 4 states a necessary condition for having a belief: one believes a proposition only if 
one can grasp or comprehend the proposition. Audi (1994: 421) states that in order to believe that p, 
one must “have a thought of the relevant proposition p”; p must be able to “come to one’s mind.” In 
other words, if a proposition is too complex for one to grasp, forming a belief is impossible; if S 
cannot grasp Mp, Mp cannot come to S’s mind in a way that makes it possible for S to believe it. 
                                                        
12 Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to expand on this point.  
13 Thanks to Alan Hájek for helpful discussion about the defense of this premise.  
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 Note also that this premise is fairly ecumenical when it comes to various views of the nature 
of belief. It is consistent with the idea that one can have beliefs (such as dispositional beliefs) that have 
never been occurrent; for example, you might currently believe that electrons don’t wear sneakers 
even if you’ve never explicitly considered that proposition before. Premise 4 merely commits us to 
the idea that in order to have a belief that p, it must be possible to grasp p. This does not require a past 
occurrent awareness of p. 
Generally, in the case of barely graspable propositions, agents can have credences in them, but 
cannot form the more complex modal beliefs required for the belief-first view. Further, these cases 
are easily explained by both credence-first and dualist views. On both views, a credence is a unique 
attitude that does not reduce to a kind of believing, and, crucially, the numerical or probabilistic 
component of credences is a part of the attitude, rather than part of the content. Thus, on both views, 
forming a credence in p does not require grasping a proposition more complex than p. In this, the 
graspability concerns outlined here are a unique problem for the belief-first view, which relies on 
complexified content, rather than a feature of the attitude, to ground the credence. 
 
 
3. Objections and Replies  
 
Premise 1 states that edge propositions exist. Recall that p is an edge proposition for S iff p is on the 
edge of S’s comprehension, such that S can grasp p, but, for any proposition more complex than p, S 
cannot grasp it. One might object to premise 1 and argue that edge propositions do not exist. There 
are several reasons one might deny the existence of edge propositions. First, one might argue that S 
can grasp a more complex proposition, using a general strategy for making initially ungraspable 
propositions graspable, such as the phenomena of exemplification discussed by Catherine Elgin. Elgin 
(2009, 2011) argues that in cases where things are quite complex and nuanced, a model or stand-in 
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can exemplify the main points, so we can grasp them.14 Similarly, one might argue that there’s no sharp 
cut off between the graspable and the ungraspable. Rather, as propositions get more complex, 
graspability just gets harder and harder at each level.15 
 There are a few things to say in response. First, arguments like Elgin’s raise interesting 
questions about the bounds of graspability, and are useful for answering questions about where exactly 
we ought to draw this line between the graspable and the ungraspable. For my argument to work, 
however, we need not take a stand on where exactly this line is; we just need some boundary (even 
one that is agent-relative) to exist. Thus, strategies like Elgin’s don’t raise a problem for my argument, 
since they don’t purport to get rid of the line altogether, but merely suggest that we may have drawn 
it in the wrong place.   
 Generally, drawing the line between the graspable and the ungraspable is a difficult task. One 
reason for this is because there are different ways that a proposition can be made more complex. And 
in some situations, adding significant complexity to a proposition—like a shift in perspective—may 
make a proposition ungraspable, but adding less complexity—like a negation—may not. The case of 
Sally’s mother, for instance, may not actually be a perfect example of an edge proposition, since it 
does seem like Sally’s mother might be able to grasp the sentence if it were negated or modified in 
some minor way, especially if she took time to really think through what was said. But adding a shift 
in perspective, such as “My daughter is annoyed that he said that she said that she knows that he 
believes that she is mad at him” might push her over the edge. Identifying what proposition exactly is 
an edge proposition for Sally’s mother isn’t essential for our purposes (and this will depend on her 
cognitive abilities); where we need to take a stand is that edge propositions exist, and there is a definite 
line between the graspable and the ungraspable, even if it is sometimes difficult to identify.16  
                                                        
14 Thanks to Georgi Gardiner.  
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee.  
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee.  
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But why think this line exists at all? This brings me to a second reply. First, it is worth noting 
that in order for my argument to create a problem for the belief-first view, all I need is one case. I 
need not claim that there is a sharp graspability cut off in every case, or that there is always a strict 
binary between graspable and ungraspable. It is consistent with my argument that graspability takes 
different forms in different contexts; I merely need there to be a threshold of graspability in some 
possible contexts.  
And these contexts do seem possible; many of us have likely had the experience of hearing an 
edge proposition and grasping it, and the experience of hearing a more complex proposition (even a 
slightly more complex one) and being unable to understand its meaning. This supports the idea that 
such a cut-off exists (even if not in every case). At the very least, insisting such a cut off is impossible 
puts the belief-firster in the awkward position of having to take a controversial stance on the nature 
of graspability, that is, that graspability can never, in any case, be a threshold concept. This is a 
significant cost to the view, and, as noted above, at odds with the way most in the literature have 
understood graspability.17  
 Generally, then, it is hard to see what would support the claim that no possible agent can form 
a credence in an edge-proposition. This seems like a coherent and even common phenomenon: 
someone states an edge-proposition and you form a degree of confidence in that proposition, even 
though it is right on the cusp of your comprehension. Without further motivation, we shouldn’t rule 
out the possibility of these cases a priori.18   
                                                        
17 See Audi (1993: 209, 1994: 421), Klien (1999), Bergmann (2005: 432, 2006: ch. 1), Fales (2014: 349–350). 
18 A related objection appeals to the following possibility: when propositions increase in complexity, this takes the form 
of a Zeno-like open interval. In this case, each increase in complexity takes you closer to a cut-off, but no finite increase 
in complexity takes you over the edge. Suppose you cannot grasp a proposition with complexity level 100, and suppose 
you have a set of propositions p1–pn, such that each proposition represents a more complex proposition. Possibly, p1 is 
complexity level 99, p2 is complexity level 99.5, p3 is complexity level 99.75, p4 is complexity level 99.875, etc. If 
complexity takes this form, a belief-firster can posit increasingly complex of propositions but nonetheless maintain that 
there is a bound of graspability (that is never reached). This sense of complexity, however, does not seem to describe the 
kind of complexity added by epistemic modals. Embedding a modal proposition in additional modals doesn’t seem to add 
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 A second way one might object to premise 1 by arguing that, while Mp is more complex than 
p, Mp simply gives p a certain ‘shading’ or ‘valence.’ Maybe one who grasps p can always grasp a 
proposition slightly more complex than p, as long as the more complex proposition only minimally 
modifies the initial proposition. Thus S can grasp slightly more complex propositions like Mp, even 
though p is on the edge of S’s graspability.19  
First, this ‘shading’ hypothesis is more reasonable in the case of simple modal beliefs like 
probably p, but presumably, it’s also possible to have precise credences in edge propositions. It is difficult 
to see how one could grasp the probability of p is 0.5 in virtue of merely grasping p. 
But second and more importantly, it’s hard to see what it means to grasp a proposition with a 
certain shading or valence. I suspect that agents in these cases aren’t actually grasping more complex 
propositions. In other words, when p is ‘shaded’ by an epistemic modal and S grasps p, S is not actually 
forming a belief with the content Mp. Rather, the content of S’s attitude is simply p, and the shading 
is a feature of the attitude S takes toward p. In the same way that a belief that p and a desire that p are 
phenomenologically different but share content, a belief in p and a credence in p share content but 
holding each feels different—the attitudes present the same proposition in different lights. Thus, the 
ability to grasp p with a certain shading or valence doesn’t give us reason to think that S is grasping 
Mp rather than p. The added complexity is in the attitude rather than the content—nothing is grasped 
other than p. 
 Recall premise 2.2: if S can believe p, S can have a credence in p. One might object to this 
premise, arguing that the agents in the pertinent cases can form beliefs but not credences in edge 
propositions. One might argue that, in order to form a credence in p, grasping p is not enough; one 
                                                        
less complexity with each iteration—it’s hard to see why the fifth epistemic modal would add significantly less complexity 
than the first. Thanks to Jeremy Strasser and David Builes for raising this objection.  
19 Thanks to Josh Smart and Mousa Mohammadian. 
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has to be able to grasp a proposition more complex than p. Credence is a more intricate attitude than 
belief, and thus sometimes grasping a proposition is sufficient to form a belief but not a credence.20 
In reply, the idea that there are propositions that we can believe but cannot form credences in 
is odd. The suggestion that it is merely possible to believe p without having a credence in p is 
controversial. Denying this premise requires not only that this be possible, but that there be cases 
where one believes p yet it is impossible for one to form any credence at all in p (precise, vague, fuzzy, 
imprecise, etc.). This reply rules out all credence-first views. Pre-theoretically, it seems perfectly 
possible to form credences in propositions that are graspable, but just on the edge of graspability.21 
Denying premise 2.2 thus does not seem like a promising route. 
Premise 4 states that if S cannot grasp Mp, S cannot believe Mp. One might object by invoking 
testimony to establish that one can believe a proposition without grasping it. Suppose Peter knows 
that Tim is a remarkably reliable agent, and Tim utters a proposition that Peter cannot grasp. Plausibly, 
Peter might believe Tim’s testimony without grasping the content uttered. Peter might come to believe 
a proposition on the basis of testimony, even if it is beyond the bounds of Peter’s graspability. Thus, 
one can believe propositions without grasping their content, contra premise 4.22 
In reply, it’s not plausible that Peter actually believes the proposition Tim utters. Since Peter 
does not understand the content uttered, Peter won’t encode the information in the way beliefs do, 
and whatever new attitude Peter has won’t play the same functional role as a belief, represent the 
                                                        
20 See Holton (2014). Thanks to Marissa Wallin, Jeremy Strasser, and Josh Smart. 
21 Even if, in most cases, it involves or rationally requires withholding belief/having a middling credence in them, as 
Bergmann (2005: 432) suggests. Bergmann considers the case of an agent considering a proposition just on the cusp of his 
graspability. Bergmann notes, “by exerting himself mentally, [he can] barely grasp it, although he also finds himself 
withholding it because of its complexity. You might think that this is exactly what one should expect to happen to rational 
people in a reflective mood drawn to continue considering propositions at ever higher levels: before reaching a proposition 
they are unable to grasp, they will reach one which they can barely grasp and which they will be inclined to withhold 
because of its complexity.” 
22 Thanks to Peter Clutton. 
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world in the same way, or result in the same behavioral dispositions. Thus, on most major theories of 
belief, Peter simply doesn’t believe the content uttered.   
Finally, one might object that my argument has counterintuitive implications for the attitude 
of disbelief. It is commonly thought that disbelieving p just is believing not-p (Bergmann 2005: 420; 
McCain 2014: 2; Friedman 2013: 166). However, it might seem like my view entails that certain edge-
propositions can be believed, but not disbelieved—since the agent can grasp p, but cannot grasp not-
p.23   
There are three replies to this objection. First, one could argue, as does Joshua Smart 
(forthcoming), that disbelief is not belief. Smart points out that if one considers a proposition p and 
decides it is false, and thus to disbelieve it, surely one has some attitude toward p itself, not merely to 
not-p. So there may be independent motivation for thinking that disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude. 
I favor this response, but I also acknowledge that it relies on an unorthodox view of disbelief. For 
those convinced by the orthodoxy, there are two other responses. Second, one could argue that “not” 
doesn’t add the relevant dimension of complexity that makes edge propositions ungraspable. One 
interesting feature of ‘not’s is that they are collapsible—believing not (not-p) is in some sense equivalent 
to believing p. Epistemic modals and probability-beliefs (especially modifiers like “it is 0.7 probable 
that…”) add a greater dimension of complexity, and normally are not collapsible (consider the large 
variety of different modifiers, and thus all the different ways they can affect a proposition’s meaning). 
Thus, this move is not similarly available to the belief-first view. Finally, one could bite the bullet and 







                                                        
23 Thanks to Zach Barnett and an anonymous referee. 
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4. Upshots and Conclusion 
 
The implications of this argument may go beyond the case of credences; there are an array of views 
that reduce other mental states to beliefs with complex contents. For instance, some argue that 
emotions are beliefs (for example, my anger that you ate my cookie is simply the belief you wronged 
me by eating my cookie),24 that intentions are beliefs (for example, intending to drink coffee is simply 
the belief I will drink coffee),25 and that desires are beliefs (for example, desiring a new car is simply 
the belief that a new car is good).26 On some of these views, mental states reduce to beliefs with 
complex content. However, in so far as my arguments are successful against the reduction of credence 
to belief, they may count against versions of these other reductionist views as well. In the case of 
barely graspable propositions (and barely graspable contents more generally), one ought to be able to 
have an emotion / intention / desire with p as its content, in virtue of merely grasping p, but these 
views require one to grasp a more complex proposition. 
Of course, there are numerous versions of these reductionist views, and many are more 
nuanced than my examples suggest—I do not claim that this is a problem for all reductionist views. I 
simply note that my argument may be applicable beyond the case of credence. I leave the details for 
further research, as my primary goal in this paper is to argue against belief-first views. 
I’ve argued that any content-enhancing belief-first view runs into serious trouble when it 
comes to edge propositions. One can form a credence in these propositions, but one cannot believe 
Mp, because Mp is too complex for one to grasp. I conclude that, however credences differ from 
beliefs, they do not differ virtue of adding additional content to the believed proposition. 
 
 
                                                        
24 See Roberts (1998), Neu (2000), Nussbaum (2001); many Stoics also held this view. 
25 See Velleman (1999), Setiya (2007), Marušić and Schwenkler (2018). Adam Wodeham, a medieval philosopher, also held 
this view; see Pickavé (2012).  
26 See Price (1989), Hedden (2015: 156-7, 173), Gregory (2017, forthcoming).  
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